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NOTE 
SECTION 401 OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO NONPOINT 
SOURCE POLLUTION 
IN CALIFORNIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in Oregon 
Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck I ("Dombeck") that "certifica-
tion under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act is not required 
for grazing permits or other federal licensed activities that 
may cause pollution solely from nonpoint sources. "2 The court 
not only excluded grazing from the certification requirement 
under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (the Act), but also 
ruled that all discharges from solely nonpoint sources are ex-
cluded from the state certification process.3 By upholding the 
validity of the grazing permit in the absence of state certifica-
tion, the court substantially limited states' ability to regulate 
non point source pollution originating on federal lands. This 
1 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. (1998». 
2 ld. at 1099. "Nonpoint source" is not specifically defined in the Act's definition 
section, but is generally associated with agricultural practices. Section 208(b)(2)(F) of 
the Act partially defines nonpoint sources as return flows from irrigated agriculture, 
runofTfrom manure disposal and land used for livestock production. 
3 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1094. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. Section 401 authorizes a state to 
regulate any activity within its jurisdiction that requires federal permitting or licens-
ing, to ensure that the activity complies with the state's water quality standards. The 
power is in the form of a "certification" granted by the state that the activity will com-
ply with applicable standards. 
101 
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note addresses the Dombeck opinion and its relation to the 
State of California's non point source water pollution. 
A brief description of Section 401 provides contextual sup-
port for the court's holding in Dombeck. In addition, the full 
impact of the Dombeck decision on California water quality 
cannot be understood without a discussion of the current non-
point source pollution issues, and pollution control mecha-
nisms currently in place on federal lands within California. 
Therefore, a brief analysis of nonpoint source pollution issues 
and policy (generally in the context of grazing) will precede the 
Dombeck case analysis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In drafting the Clean Water Act (the Act),4 Congress at-
tempted to divide water pollution into two distinct categories. S 
The Act generally provides for federal control, or oversight, of 
"point sources" and state control of "non point sources. "6 How-
ever, this division of authority is blurred by provisions in the 
Act, which delegate authority to the states to manage water 
4 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § § 101 to 607, 33 U.S.C. § § 1251 to 1387 
(1994). 
6 
Under the Act, water pollution has been divided into point sources, and nonpoint 
sources. Point sources are defined in, and are directly regulated by, the Act through 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). "The term point 
source means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but bot 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." 33 U.S.C. § 1362 
(14) (1994). 
6 • See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096·97. "The Clean Water Act defines pomt sources as 
'discernible, confined and discrete conveyances' such as a pipe, ditch, or machine. 33 
U.S.C.A. 1362." [d. at 1095. For the definition of discharge see infra at footnote 10. 
"The district court reasoned that because the unqualified term 'discharge' is defined as 
including, but is not limited to, point source releases, it must include releases from 
nonpoint sources as well." [d. at 1096. 
2
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quality within its borders,1 Section 401 of the Act is one of sev-
eral such provisions. Section 401 requires: 
Any applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct any 
activity, including but not limited to, the construction or opera-
tion of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the 
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing' or permitting 
agency a certification from the State in which the discharge 
originates or will originate, or if appropriate, from the inter-
state water pollution control agency having jurisdiction over 
the navigable waters· at the point where the discharge origi-
nates or will originate, that any such discharge will comply 
with applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 
and 1317 of this title. No license or permit shall be granted 
until the certification required by this section has been ob-
tained or has been waived as provided in the preceding sen-
tence.8 (emphasis added) 
The division of authority is further blurred by Section 402 
of the Act. Section 402 permits states to regulate point source 
discharges after developing a federally approved National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program.9 
Hence, the federal grant of authority to the state does not 
make Section 401 controversial. Rather, the controversy over 
Section 401 centers on which types of discharges fall within its 
purview, and thus within the jurisdiction of the state. 
7 Section 208 of the Act requires states to monitor and control nonpoint source pol-
lution. Under Section 208 (b)(2)(F) the states are required to 
"(i)dentify ... agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources of pollution, 
including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and the cumulative effects, runoff 
from manure disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and crop production, and 
(ii) set forth procedures and methods (including land use requirements) to control to 
the extent feasible such sources." 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (b)(2)(F) (1994). 
8 33 U.S.C § 1341 (1994). 
9 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (1994). Under Section 1342 of the Act (FWPCA Section 402), 
states which chose to implement their own NPDES program submit to the Adminis-
trator a "full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and 
administer," and "shall submit a statement from the attorney general ... that the laws 
of the state ... provide adequate authority to carry out the described program." 33 
U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (1994). 
3
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A confounding issue is that Congress failed to adequately 
distinguish between its different uses of the word "discharge" 
in the Act.1O While Congress clearly intended to create more 
than one meaning for the term discharge, it did not clarify 
what the different meanings are or specify when they apply. 
Additionally, two district courts within the Ninth Circuit terri-
tory reached opposite conclusions with regard to the definition 
of "discharge" for purposes of applying Section 401." The cor-
rect interpretation of the term "discharge," as used in Section 
401 of the Act, is the keystone to a correct interpretation of 
Section 401. 
Historically, California has not applied Section 401 certifi-
cation to purely nonpoint source discharges resulting from fed-
erally licensed activities. A definitive interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act sanctioning such a use of Section 401 certifi-
cation may impel some California regional water boards to im-
plement the statute accordingly.12 
In California, where the federal government owns 44.6 per-
cent of the state's 101 million acres,13 non point source pollution 
10 The term "discharge" is defined twice in the Act: 
The term "discharge of a pollutant," and the term "discharge of pollutants," each 
means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) 
any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from 
any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12) 
(1994). The term "discharge" when used without qualification includes a discharge of 
a pollutant, and discharge of pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (16) (1994). 
11 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held in the case 
upon which this appeal is based that "§ 401 applies to all federally permitted activities 
that may result in a discharge, including discharges from non-point sources." Oregon 
Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1541, (1996). In contrast, the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho reached the opposite conclusion 
when deciding whether pollution caused by erosion resulting from a logging road re-
quired Section 401 certification. In Caswell, the court held that "since the forest road 
project is a nonpoint source activity and since the Forest Service has complied with 
the requisite federal and state requirements regarding the Act, Section 401 certifica-
tion is not required." Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell, No. 95-394, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21980, at 26 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996). 
12 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous, chief planner, California Regional Wa-
ter Quality Control Board (April 25, 1999). 
13 
Public Land Statistics 1997. United States Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Land Management: Public Land Statistics 1997, Vol. 182, March 1998, p. 7. 
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from federal lands is a significant problem. The majority of 
the federal land in California is owned by the United States 
Forest Service (USFS) which owns 20 million acres. 14 The Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM), which owns 14 million 
acres, also controls a large portion of federal land in 
California. IS In 1996, the USFS authorized grazing of 372,555 
Animal Unit Months (AUMs) on USFS lands in California. 16 
Grazing activities can adversely impact the environment by 
removing native vegetation, causing soil erosion, compaction, 
and creating excessive sediment, pathogen, and nutrient loads 
into rivers, streams, and stationary bodies of water. 17 As cattle 
tend to concentrate around streams and other bodies of water, 
they trample streamside vegetation, resulting in streamside 
instability, and accelerated bank erosion. IS In addition, in-
creased sedimentation and trampled stream banks increase 
water temperature and create conditions uninhabitable for 
trout and salmonids. 19 Furthermore, nutrient loading occurs as 
a result of animals "defecating directly into the flowing 
water. "20 The increased livestock fecal matter (nutrient load-
ing) introduces excessive amounts of bacteria into the water 
and reduces the available oxygen in the water.21 As half of Cali-
14 
USDA Forest Service; Areas by State (visited Dec. 12, 1999) 
<http://www.r5.fs.fed.uslforestmanagemenetJhtmllfacts.html>. 
15 United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management: Public 
Land Statistics 1997, Vol. 182, March 1998, p. 10. See also Public Land Statistics 
1997, p. 10. 
16 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service: Range Management 
Grazing Statistical Summary FY 1996, p. 34. (An animal unit month is the amount of 
forage required to support a mature 1000 pound cow for one month). The National 
Forest Service authorized a total of 633 permittees to graze over 100,000 animals on 
NFS lands in California in 1996. 
17 
Water Quality Control Plan for the Lahontan Region, CRWQCB, 1994, p. 4.9-
21. 
18 
Id at 4.9-20. 
19 
Id. See: Thomas L. Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in West-
ern North America, 8 Con6ervation Biology 636 (1994). 
20 
University of California at Davis Center for Range and Forested Ecosystems, 
Rangeland Watershed Program Fact Sheets, Fact Sheet No. 20: Reducing Stream Im-
pacts with Water Developments-An Example (visited Nov. 8, 1998) 
<http://agronomy.ucdavis.edulcalrng/h20.htm>. 
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fomia's fresh water originates from National Forest Lands, the 
damage caused by nonpoint source pollution on federal lands 
threatens the state's source of clean water.22 The state's cur-
rent nonpoint pollution control system fails to adequately pro-
tect the water resource. 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Dombeck/3 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 
United States Forest Service violated Section 401 of the Clean 
Water Act24 by issuing a grazing permit to a rancher without 
first obtaining certification by the State of Oregon acknowl-
edging that the grazing would not violate the state's water 
quality standards.2' The court's decision hinged upon the in-
terpretation of the term "discharge" as it appears in Section 
401 of the Act.26 
In Dombeck, the United States Forest Service (USFS) 
granted the Burils' a permit to graze fifty head of cattle within 
the Malheur National Forest in 1993.27 The cattle, which graze 
for several months of the year, pollute two nearby waterways 
by increasing the temperature, sediment load, and waste levels 
21 
Alia Miles, Searching for the Definition of"Discharge": Section 401 of the Clean 
Water Act, 28 ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 202 1998. 
22 
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region, Facts about National Forests 
in California (visited April 29, 1999) 
<http://www.r5.fs.fed.uslforestmanagemenetJhtmVfacts.htmi>. 
23 
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. (1998». 
24 See id. at 1095. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (the Act) requires: "Any 
Applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which may result 
in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting 
agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates. . . that any 
such discharge will comply with applicable provisions of Sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 
1316, and 1317 of this title .... No license or permit shall be granted until the certifi-
cation required by this section has been obtained or has been waived." 33 U.S.C. § 
1341 (aX!) (1994). 
25 See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1094. 
26 
See id. at 1095. The term discharge is used in the unqualified form in Section 
401. 
27 
See id. at 1094. 
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of the water.28 In 1994, the Oregon Natural Desert Association 
(ONDA) filed a suit under the citizen suit provision of the Act 
(33 U.S.C. § 1365) and the Administrative Procedures Act (5 
U.S.C. § 702).29 ONDA claimed that the USFS had violated 
Section 401 of the Act by issuing the grazing permit before ob-
taining the state's certification that the grazing allowed under 
the permit would not cause any violations of the state's water 
quality standards.30 The United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon granted plaintiff's summary judgment mo-
tion, holding that the USFS is required to obtain certification 
from the state before granting permits which may cause non-
point source pollution.31 
The key to the district court's decision was its holding re-
garding the definition of the term "discharge." The district 
court held that the unqualified term "discharge," as used in 
Section 401, includes both point and nonpoint sources.l2 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding, concluding 
that the term "discharge" does not include nonpoint sources.33 
As this note will explain, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the 
term "discharge" is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
term as defined in the Act, the Act's legislative history, and the 
structure of the Act. All suggest a broader interpretation of 
the term "discharge. ":l4 
28 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1094. 
29 See id. The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation intervened 
as plaintiffs, and the Burrils, Grant County, and the Eastern Public Lands Coalition 
intervened as defendants. See id. 
30 
See id. 
31 S 'd ee, . 
32 
See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (D. Or. 
1996). 
33 
See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098. 
34 The term "broader" is used in this sentence to mean broader than the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation. 
7
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IV. THE CLEAN WATER ACT SUPPORTS A BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "DISCHARGE" 
A. THE PLAIN MEANING OF SECTION 401 DOES NOT LIMIT 
"DISCHARGE" TO POINT SOURCE DISCHARGES. 
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (the Act) uses the term 
"discharge" in its unqualified form. There is agreement among 
the courts that the unqualified form of the term "discharge" is 
broader than the term when it is used in conjunction with the 
word "pollutant." The courts have not reached consensus, 
however, over what additional discharges are captured by the 
larger definition. 
In Dombeck, the Ninth Circuit held that the unqualified 
term is broader because it "includes all releases from point 
sources, whether polluting or nonpolluting. "ls The Ninth Cir-
cuit simply adopted an interpretation of the term "discharge" 
used by the District of Colombia Circuit court in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch ("Gorsuch").36 However, the 
Ninth Circuit did not specify how Gorsuch supports its inter-
pretation of the term "discharge." 
Further, the Ninth Circuit did not explain why inclusion of 
nonpolluting point sources in the definition of "discharge" nec-
essarily precludes an interpretation of the term that includes 
additional meanings. No language exists in the statute or 
cases that necessarily limits the definition of the term dis-
charge to only polluting and nonpolluting point sources, as op-
posed to point sources and nonpoint sources. 
The sole issue in Gorsuch was "whether certain dam-
induced water quality changes constitute the 'discharge of a 
pollutant' as that term is defined in section 502(12) of the Act," 
36 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098 (citing National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 
F. 2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982». 
36 
See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156. 
8
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and thus should be regulated under Section 402 of the Act.37 In 
Gorsuch, the court asserted that dam operators were required 
to operate under Section 402 of the Act and obtain a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.38 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
argued that the water quality changes caused by the dam did 
not fall within the statutory definition of "discharge of pollut-
ants," and thus were not subject to the Section 402 permit pro-
cess.39 The EPA also stated that the discharge from the dam 
should be regulated under Section 208 of the Act which ad-
dresses areawide waste treatment management.4O The Gor-
such court deferred to the EPA's interpretation.41 
Relying on Gorsuch, the Ninth Circuit held that the term 
"discharge," as used in Section 401, refers to nonpolluting point 
sources, rather than nonpoint sources.42 The Ninth Circuit 
based its conclusion on the fact that the discharge at issue in 
Gorsuch was held to be a point source void of pollutants as de-
37 
See id. at 161. Section 502 (12) of the Act is the definition of "discharge of a 
pollutant." The section reads: " The term discharge of a pollutant and the term 'dis-
charge of pollutants' each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contigu-
ous zone or to the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floati~ 
craft." 33 U.S.C. § 1361 (12) (1994). 
38 See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164-65. "The Wildlife Federation, joined by plaintiff-
intervenor State of Missouri, argues that in light of the remedial purpose of the Act, 
this phrase [discharge of pollutants] should be read broadly enough to cover these 
dam-induced changes." ld. Once included in the definition of "discharge of pollut-
ants," the discharge would require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
permit under the Act. See id. at 165. 
39 See id. The EPA is the federal agency responsible for administering the Act; 
"EPA certainly has responsibility for administering the Act." ld. at 169. "As a general 
rule, courts must give 'great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the 
officers or agency charged with its administration.m ld. at 166 (citing EPA v. National 
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64,83,1980). The EPA stated, "Accordingly, we do not 
believe that the discharge from a dam constitutes a "discharge of pollutants" within 
the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act." ld. at 169 n.39. 
40 See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 179. 
41 See id. at 171. "We conclude from that analysis that EPA's interpretation of 
the specific provisions of the Act is reasonable and not inconsistent with the legislative 
purposes and so must be upheld." ld. 
42 See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098. 
9
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fined in the Act.43 However, the Gorsuch court never addressed 
the term "discharge" as it appears in Section 401 of the Act. In 
fact, Section 401 is mentioned only once in the opinion, in a 
footnote. 44 Specifically, the Gorsuch court held only that the 
dam discharge at issue did not fall within the definition of 
"discharge of pollutants" as found in Section 402 of the Act.4s 
Further, the simple fact that the dam discharge falls within 
the purview of Section 208 does not speak to whether or not it 
falls within the definition of "discharge" under Section 401,46 
Finally, in light of the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Gorsuch, it 
is significant to note the Gorsuch court's admonishment re-
garding the narrowness of its own decision.47 As stated above, 
the Gorsuch court did not address, nor did it indicate an intent 
to rule on, the issue of the definition of the term "discharge" as 
used in Section 401 of the Act. 
The second main holding in Dombeck was that the interpre-
tation of the Act affirmatively prohibits the term "discharge" 
from including nonpoint sources.48 To support the holding that 
"discharge" does not include nonpoint sources, the Ninth Cir-
cuit referenced other sections of the Act which have been de-
termined not to govern nonpoint sources. Specifically, the 
43 • See ,d. Dams are capable of creating point source and nonpoint source dis-
charges. The EPA, however, considers dams to be nonpoint sources, and regulates 
them as such. See National Wildlife Federation, 693 F.2d at 168. 
44 [d. at 183, n.78. The Gorsuch court noted that the issue in that case was 
largely limited to existing dams, because, "new dams cannot be built unless they com-
ply with state water quality requirements." [d. at 183. 
45 
See id. at 161. 
46 
The Gorsuch court held only that the discharge at issue was not subject to the 
NPDES permit requirements. See [d. It does not affirmatively bear on the meaning of 
what is included in the term discharge of an entirely different section of the Act. 
47 The Gorsuch court stated: "In closing, we emphasize the narrowness of our de-
cision. It is not our function to decide whether EPA's interpretation of the term 'dis-
charge of a pollutant' is the best one or even whether it is more reasonable than the 
Wildlife Federation's interpretation. We hold merely that EPA's interpretation is 
reasonable, not inconsistent with congressional intent, and entitled to great deference; 
therefore, it must be upheld. The judgment of the district court is reversed." Gorsuch, 
693 F.2d at 183. 
48 See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097. Here the Ninth Circuit states that the an in-
terpretation of the term discharge that includes non point sources is "contrary to the 
structure and plain meaning of the Act." [d. 
10
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court cited Oregon Natural Resources Council v. USFS 
(USFS).49 
In USFS, the Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC) 
claimed the USFS's plan to build roads in conjunction with a 
timber sale to Bugaboo Timber Company violated the Clean 
Water Act's provisions, which require the USFS to meet cer-
tain state water quality standards. 50 The Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council alleged that a violation of state water quality 
standards provided standing to sue under Section 1365, the 
citizen suit provision of the Act.51 Although Section 1365 does 
not mention state water quality violations on its face, it does 
authorize citizen suits under Section 1311 (Effluent Limita-
tions).52 The ONRC alleged standing under Section 
1311(b)(1)(c) because this section specifically refers to state 
water quality standards.53 In affirming the district court's de-
cision, the Ninth Circuit held that the mere fact that Section 
1311 of the Act referenced state water quality standards does 
not mean that Section 1311 applies to nonpoint sources. 54 The 
USFS court concluded that the "title and construction of Sec-
tion 1311(b)(1) constricts the limitations set forth within that 
section to effluent limitations."55 Further, by definition, those 
limitations are only applicable to point sources.56 
49 Oregon Natural Resources Council v. USFS, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987). 
50 
See id., 834 F.2d at 848. 
51 
Id. 
52 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). 
53 See USFS, 834 F.2d at 849. "It is plaintiffs' contention that because section 
1311(b)(lXC) incorporates state water quality standards established pursuant to sec-
tion 1313 and does not explicitly refer to point sources, plaintiffs are entitled to sue 
under the citizen suit provision of the Act to enforce state water quality standards 
affected by nonpoint sources." Id. 
54 The USFS court explained that "emuent limitations may be derived from state 
water quality standards and may be enforced when included in a discharger's permit. 
We agree with defendants that it is not the water quality standards themselves that 
are enforceable in section 1311(b)(1)(C), but it is the 'limitations necessary to meet' 
those standards, or 'required to implement' the standards." Id. at 850. 
55 . 
Id. 
56 Id. 
11
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on USFS is unfounded for two 
reasons. First, the facts of the two cases are disparate. 57 Even 
assuming that the USFS court was correct to ~onclude that 
Section 1311 does not apply to nonpoint sources, this argument 
does not logically apply to Dombeck. The focus of USFS was 
the title of the section at issue, Section 1311.58 In contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit in Dombeck focused on Section 401 of the Act. 
Unlike the Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC), the 
Oregon Natural Desert Association, in the instant case, relied 
on the state water quality standards referenced in Section 401, 
not Section 1311(b)(1)(c).59 Section 401 is entitled "Certifica-
tion," and the provisions therein may not be categorically re-
stricted to point source limitations based on the section title as 
they were in USFS. Therefore, the Dombeck court could not 
conclude, based on USFS, that the title "Certification" by defi-
nition limits Section 401 to point sources. In addition, the 
Ninth Circuit did not base its ruling solely on the fact that Sec-
tion 401 references state water quality standards. As men-
tioned above, the very definition of the word "discharge" is at 
issue. 
The second factor rendering the USFS analogy inapt is the 
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "reference to water quality 
standards in section 1311 (b)(1)(c) did not sweep nonpoint 
sources into the scope of section 1311."60 This assertion is no 
longer tenable after the United States Supreme Court decision 
in PUD No.1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology (PUD No. 1).61 
In PUD No.1, the State of Washington used the certification 
power vested in it under Section 401 to issue a minimum 
stream flow limitation as a condition on the certification for 
57 Compare supra text accompanying note 50 with supra text accompanying notes 
27-34. 
58 
The plaintiff in USFS relied on a reference in Section 1311 (Effiuent Limita-
tions) as a basis for their claim. [d. at 849. 
59 
See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1095. 
60 [d. at 1097. 
61 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 
(1994). 
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construction of a dam that involved at least two point source 
discharges.62 The utility company building the dam claimed 
that "the minimum stream flow requirement imposed by the 
State was unrelated to these specific discharges, and that as a 
consequence, the State of Washington lacked the authority un-
der section 401 to condition its certification on maintenance of 
stream flows."63 The United States Supreme Court in PUD No. 
1 upheld the conditions placed on the dam by the state.64 In 
doing so the Court held that Section "401(d) is most reasonably 
read as authorizing additional conditions and limitations on 
the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the exis-
tence of a discharge, is satisfied."6S 
In PUD No.1, the Supreme Court reached the exact oppo-
site conclusion than the Ninth Circuit court in Dombeck by 
holding that "[S]ection 301 in turn incorporates section 303 by 
reference."66 The Court further held that "[t]his provision of 
section 301 [33 U.S.C.A § 1311] expressly refers to state water 
quality standards, and is not limited to discharges.''67 The 
Ninth Circuit's decision that Section 1311(b)(1)(c) is, "by defini-
tion, applicable only to point sources," is irreconcilable with 
Supreme Court's conclusions in PUD No. 1.68 If the Supreme 
Court did not limit Section 1311 to discharges, the Ninth Cir-
cuit cannot limit Section 1311 to only point source discharges.69 
The Dombeck court erroneously relied on PUD No. 1 to support 
its conclusion that Section 401 does not apply to discharges 
62 
See id. at 711. While the dam did involve discharges, the minimum stream 
flow requirement was not one of them. The state of Washington used the fact that 
there were discharges to regulate a non discharge aspect of the project, i.e. minimum 
stream flows. See id. 
63 See id. 
64 
See id. at 712. 
66 
PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 712. 
66 
See id. at 713. 
67 See id. n.3. 
68 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097. 
69 
The Supreme Court expounded upon the issue at length. In addition to the 
above statements on the issue, the Court held that, "ensuring compliance with § 303 is 
a proper function of the § 401 certification." PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. 
at 712. 
13
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resulting solely from nonpoint sources. The Ninth Circuit 
rests on a misrepresentation of PUD No.1. 
In Dombeck, the Ninth Circuit interpreted PUD No. 1 to 
hold that the state is "free to impose such water quality limita-
tions" once the threshold condition of a point source discharge 
is met.70 However, the Court in PUD No.1 never addressed 
the specific requirement of the discharge, and whether or not it 
had to be a point source or nonpoint source discharge. Addi-
tionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that "PUD No. 1 did not 
broaden the meaning of the term 'discharge' under section 
1341."71 Likewise, the PUD No. 1 Court did not limit the 
meaning of the term "discharge" to point sources. The nature 
of the threshold discharge was not the pivotal issue in PUD. 
No.1. The central question, rather, was whether the entire 
activity including non-discharge components could be limited.72 
The Court held that it could be limited.?3 
Further, the Dombeck court made two incorrect assump-
tions in its interpretation of PUD No.1. First, as mentioned, 
there is no specific requirement in PUD No. 1 that the thresh-
old discharge be a point source discharge.74 Second, the condi-
tions the state may impose on certification may be placed on 
the "activity as a whole," and are not limited to "water quality 
limitations" as stated by the Ninth Circuit. Here, as in Gor-
such and USFS, the Dombeck court has misread prior prece-
dent because none of these cases directly address the definition 
of the term "discharge" as used in Section 401. 
70 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097-98. 
71 [d. at 1098. 
72 See PUD No.1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 710. "The principal dispute in 
this case concerns whether the minimum stream flow requirement that the State 
imposed on the Elkhorn Project is a permissible condition of a § 401 certification under 
the Clean Water Act." [d. 
73 
See id. at 723. "In summary, we hold that the State may include minimum 
stream flow requirements in a certification issued pursuant to § 401 of the Clean Wa-
ter Act insofar as necessary to enforce a designated use contained in a state water 
quality standard." [d. 
74 
See supra note 72. The question in PUD No. 1 was whether a non discharge 
condition could be placed on state certification. 
14
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The plain meaning of Section 401 does not support an in-
terpretation of the term "discharge" that is limited to point 
source discharges. While the courts have yet to thoroughly 
interpret the meaning of the t~rm "discharge" as used in Sec-
tion 401, the Supreme Court's ruling in PUD No.1 clearly re-
futes the Dombeck court's conclusion that Section 401 certifica-
tion is limited to point source discharges. 
B. THE STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 401 
DOES NOT LIMIT "DISCHARGE" TO POINT SOURCE DISCHARGES 
To analyze the statutory definition of the term "discharge," 
the Ninth Circuit examined the language of the statute as a 
whole, its object and its policy.7' The court's analysis "hinge[d] 
on the interpretation of the term 'discharge' as used in section 
(401)," to determine whether it includes nonpoint source dis-
charges. 76 
The Ninth Circuit stressed the legislative intent underlying 
the 1972 enactment of the Clean Water Act, stating that it re-
placed a system based on water quality standards with one 
relying on point source effiuent limitations.77 The Ninth Cir-
cuit emphasized two important flaws identified by Congress 
with the old statute. First, the statute was cumbersome to 
enforce, requiring regulators to work backward starting from a 
polluted body of water and search for responsible parties up-
stream.78 Second, the statute provided no incentives to deter 
polluting into bodies of water that met water quality stan-
75 See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096. 
76 Id. at 1095. 
77 
See id. at 1096-97. "The Clean Water Act thus overhauled the regulation of 
water quality." Id. at 1096. The effect of the 1972 enactment was to place limits on 
each individual discharger, regardless of the quality of the water into which the dis-
charge was received. See id. Prior to the 1972 amendments (also known as the Clean 
Water Act), water pollution was controlled by focussing on maintaining water quality 
standards in bodies of water. Polluters were limited by the degree of pollution in the 
body of water their effiuent was entering rather than by the pollution they were con-
tributing themselves. See id. 
78 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096. 
15
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dards.79 Additionally, the old statute focused on the effects 
rather than the causes of pollution.80 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the adoption of the 1972 
amendments to mean that the Act "only banned discharges 
from point sources. "81 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that non-
point sources are not directly regulated by the Act. 82 Instead, 
nonpoint sources are regulated by the states through various 
provisions of the Act which confer upon the state the charge of 
"identification and control of non point source pollution. "83 The 
Ninth Circuit also discussed the legislative intent underlying 
changes made in the language of Section 401 by the 1972 en-
actment.84 The court noted that prior to 1972 Section 401 re-
quired federally licensed activities to receive state certification 
that the activities would not violate the applicable state water 
quality standards.8s The term "activities" in Section 401 was 
replaced with the word "discharge" in the 1972 amendment. 
The amended Section 401 requires that "any discharge from 
the licensed activity comply with the applicable provisions of 
Sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of Title 33. 33 
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)."86 The court cited a 1971 Senate Report to 
highlight the significance of the change,81 
79 
See id. 
80 
See id. 
81 
ld. The court stated that this is "presumably because they could be more easily 
identified and regulated that (sic) nonpoint source polluters." ld. (citing Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F. 2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. (1990». 
82 See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096. The Ninth Circuit stated that the "Act pro-
vides no direct mechanism to control nonpoint sources." ld. at 1097 (citing Shanty 
Town ABsocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. (1988». 
S3 ld. at 1096-97 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (b)(2». 
84 
See id. at 1097. 
85 
See id (citing Pub. L. 91-224, § 21(b)(1), 84 Stat.91 (1970». 
86 
ld. 
87 
See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097. "The statute was thus amended to assure con-
sistency with the bill's changed emphasis from water quality standards to effiuent 
limitations based on the elimination of any discharge of pollutants." ld. (citing S. Rep 
. No. 414, at 69 (1971». 
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The Ninth Circuit found that the 1972 amendments are 
evidence of Congressional intent to limit Section 401 to dis-
charges from point sources.88 While the emphasis of the Clean 
Water Act's enforcement scheme may have shifted to control-
ling point sources, the facts presented by the court do not sup-
port narrowing the Act to exclude nonpoint source discharges 
from the Act's purview. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has taken a position doctri-
nally inconsistent with its own precedent. Previously, the 
Ninth Circuit in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of 
Portland (NWEA) held that "nowhere does Congress evidence 
an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality stan-
dards that have not been translated into effiuent discharge 
limitations. "89 In NWEA the Ninth Circuit additionally held 
that "[b]y introducing limitations into the CWA scheme, Con-
gress intended· to improve enforcement, not to supplant the old 
system. "90 Both of these statements are in direct and irrecon-
cilable conflict with Dombeck. For example, the Dombeck court 
specifically held that the 1972 enactment of the Act "over-
hauled the regulation of water quality," and ''largely sup-
planted the 1970 Water and Environmental Quality Improve-
ment Act."91 In contrast, the NWEA court determined that the 
Act had not supplanted the old system. These cases reveal 
that the Ninth Circuit has not developed a consistent position 
on this issue. In fact, the Ninth Circuit was forced to vacate 
its original opinion in NWEA (holding that citizens could not 
sue to enforce water quality standards on a permit that had 
not been translated into effiuent limits) after the United States 
Supreme Court decision in PUD No.1. 92 Therefore, this is fur-
88 See id. at 1096-1097. 
89 Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Portland (NWEA), 56 F.3d 979, 
986 (9th Cir. (1995». In NWEA, the court upheld the limitation of a nonpoint source 
as part of a NPDES permit. See id. at 990. 
90 [d. at 986. 
91 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1096. 
92 See NWEA, 56 F.3d 979. Before PUD No.1, the NWEA court held that citizens 
do not have standing to sue under the Act to enforce water quality standards that are 
part of a NPDES permit, unless they have been translated into effiuent limitations. 
After PUD No.1, the NWEA decision was vacated and the Ninth Circuit held that 
17
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ther evidence that water quality standards which are not ef-
fluent or permit based can be enforced under Section 401 of the 
Clean Water Act. 
Analyzing the statue as a whole, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that "discharge" is used consistently throughout the Act in ref-
erence to a point source discharge.93 The Ninth Circuit also 
pointed out that "runoff' is used in multiple sections of the Act 
to describe nonpoint sources of pollution.94 The Ninth Circuit 
then suggested that Congress would have used "runoff' in Sec-
tion 401 had it intended for that section to apply to nonpoint 
sources, thereby, justifying its position to not include nonpoint 
sources within the scope of Section 401. 9S 
To support this claim of legislative intent, the Dombeck 
court quoted Trustees for Alaska v. EPA.96 In Trustees for 
Alaska, the Ninth Circuit stated that "Congress had classified 
non point source pollution as runoff caused primarily by rain-
fall around activities that employ or create pollutants. «97 How-
ever, the relevant issue in Trustees for Alaska was whether the 
discharge from a mining sluice box was a point source, and 
hence, subject to the NPDES permitting process.98 The Trus-
tees for Alaska court did not interpret the term "discharge" as 
because Section 402 requires compliance with Section 301, and Section 301 incorpo-
rates by reference the water quality standards in Section 303, that citizens have juris-
diction to sue for a violation of a water quality standard within a NPDES permit. See 
id. at 988. "Jefferson County cast into considerable doubt our holding in Northwest 
that citizens do not have standing under the Clean Water Act to enforce water quality 
standards unless they have been translated into end-of-pipe emuent limitations." [d. 
at 981. 
93 
See Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098. "The terminology employed throughout the 
Clean Water Act cuts against ONDA's argument that the term 'discharge' includes 
nonpoint source pollution like runoff from grazing." [d. 
94 
See id. "The term 'runoff is used throughout 33 U.S.C. § 1288, describing ur-
ban wastewater plans, and 33 U.S.C. § 1414(0, providing guidelines for identification 
of non point sources of pollution. Section 1341 contains no reference to runoff." [d. 
95 
See id. at 1098. 
96 -
See Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. (1984». 
97 [d. at 558 (citing United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (lOth Cir. 
(l978». 
98 See id. at 557-58. 
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used in Section 401 of the Act.99 Further, the text of the Act 
does not so narrowly "classify" point sources as the Dombeck 
court states. For instance, Section 304(f)(2)(b) includes runoff 
as a non point source, along with many others such as "disposal 
of pollutants in wells or subsurface excavations."IOO By sug-
gesting that Congress would have used the term "runoff' in 
Section 401, as it did in Section 1323, if it "intended to require 
certification for runoff as well as discharges," the Ninth Circuit 
created a false dichotomy. 101 The court ignored extant nonpoint 
source discharges by classifying all sources as either point 
source discharges or runoff. I02 For example the Ninth Circuit 
failed to explain how the bovine waste at issue in Dombeck, of 
which a portion is directly deposited into the streams, would be 
covered by the definition of the term "runoff." 103 
The holding in Dombeck conflicts with the policy of the Act 
as stated by the Dombeck court. The court concluded that the 
Act focuses on point source polluters "presumably because they 
could be identified and regulated more easily."I04 However, in 
Dombeck, the source of the bovine waste was clearly identified, 
and the subject of a Forest Service grazing permit. 105 As a re-
sult, there is no dispute over which cattle, or which range was 
the cause of the pollution. Therefore, since the intent of Con-
99 See generally Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d 549. The Trustees for Alaska court 
did not discuss Section 401 of the Act. 
100 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (0(2)(0) (1994). Among the nonpoint sources in that section 
are: runoff from various activities, construction activity, disposal of pollutants in wells 
or in subsurface excavations, saltwater intrusion resulting from reductions of freshwa· 
ter flow, changes in the flow of any navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (O(2)(A)-(F) 
(1994). 
101 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098. 
102 As such, the court assumes that all nonpoint source discharges conceivable un-
der Section 401 are subsumed by the definition of the term "runoff". 
103 See id. "The cattle in question wade in the John Day River and thus introduce 
their waste directly into the stream." [d. 
104 [d. at 1096. 
105 See id. at 1094. "In 1993 the Forest Service issued a permit allowing Robert 
and Diana Burril to graze 50 head of cattle in Oregon's Malheur National Forest. The 
cattle graze several months a year in and around Camp Creek and the Middle Fork of 
the John Day River, polluting these waterways with their waste, increased sedimenta-
tion, and increased temperature." [d. 
19
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gress was to amend the Act in order to make enforcement more 
effective, it is doubtful that Congress intended identifiable 
nonpoint source polluters to escape regulation. 
Another issue the court failed to address is the placement of 
Section 401 in the Act. If state certification was intended to 
apply only to point source discharges, Congress would have 
simply added Section 401 as a subsection of Section 301. The 
fact that Section 401 has its own section parallel to Section 301 
implies that it is not logically confined to the narrow reading 
offered by the court. Section 401 is more reasonably read as a 
second layer protection to the states, allowing an independent 
certification of point and nonpoint source pollution. 
Under the Dombeck holding, Section 401 is restricted to 
state certification of discharges that are already heavily regu-
lated through NPDES permits. 106 Under this scenario, the pur-
pose of Section 401 is conspicuously constricted. In addition, 
under Dombeck's holding that the "term 'discharge' in Section 
[401] is limited to discharges from point sources," current certi-
fications are put at risk of being declared invalid. I01 For in-
stance, water quality standards that are part of NPDES per-
mits associated with dams are clearly not point source dis-
charges, and may be at risk of being declared invalid under the 
Dombeck opinion. The plain meaning of the Act, the Acts leg-
islative history, and structure all support a broad reading of 
the term "discharge" in Section 401 that includes nonpoint 
source discharges. 
V. CALIFORNIA WOULD BENEFIT FROM SECTION 401 
CERTIFICATION FOR SOLELY NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION. 
This section explores the potential eff~cts of the Dombeck 
decision on California's water qu.ality. Specifically, the Dom-
beck decision reduces the state's ability to regulate nonpoint 
source pollution, a leading source of water pollution within the 
106 ·th b See surpa, n. 4-9. Point sources are regulated throught the NPDES permit process el er y 
the federal government or through an approved state permitting program. 
107 
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097. 
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state. The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has identified nonpoint source pollution as a "major 
cause of water quality impairment" in California. 108 
The California State Water Resources Control Board 
(CSWRCB), which is responsible for managing nonpoint source 
pollution within the state,l09 entered into formal agreements 
with the United States Forest Service (USFS)IIO. and the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM).III Both agreements require 
the federal agencies to take responsibility for non point source 
pollution on land under their jurisdiction. 
The California State Water Resources Control Board en-
tered into a Management Agency Agreement (MAA) with the 
USFS in 1981.112 The MAA designated the USFS as the water 
quality management agency for National Forest System lands 
in California. I 13 Additionally, the MAA puts the USFS in 
charge of regulating and monitoring non point source pollution 
on Forest Service land in the state of California. I 14 The agree-
ment "contemplates" waiving the USFS's obligation to comply 
with nonpoint source waste discharge and reporting require-
ments, provided that the USFS has reasonably implemented 
108 
EPA Region 9, California Nonpoint Source Program (visited Sept. 27, 1998) 
<http://www.epa.gov/region09/water/nonpoint/caVindex.htm>. 
109 Se . f ctlOn 208 0 the Clean Water Act requires SWRCB to manage nonpoint 
source pollution. 
lID . 
Management Agency Agreement between the State Water Resources Control 
Board, State of California and the Forest Service, United States Department of Agri-
culture (May 26, 1981) (on file with author). 
111 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Bureau of Land Management, 
U.S. Department of the Interior and the California State Water Resources Control 
Board for Planning and Coordinating of Nonpoint Source Water Quality Policies and 
Activities (Jan. 27, 1993) (on file with author). 
112 
Management Agency Agreement Between the State Water Resources Control 
Board, State of California and the Forest Service, United States Department of Agri-
culture (May 26, 1981) (on file with author). 
113 See id at 2. 
114 See id. "The Forest Service Agrees: (a) To accept responsibility of the Water 
Quality Management Agency designation for NFS [Forest Service] lands in the State 
of California." [d. 
21
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Best Management Practices (BMPs).lIs In this context, BMPs 
are non point source pollution control management measures 
that are designed to ensure compliance with state water qual-
ity standards. 116 
The agreement between the USFS and the CSWRCB has 
been ineffective in regulating water quality on Forest Service 
lands in California. Under the MAA, California relies on the 
USFS to self-regulate and monitor activities creating nonpoint 
source pollution. 117 Thus, the state is placed in a reactive posi-
tion. often requiring the state to wait for a violation before it 
can act against the USFS. Further, the USFS has repeatedly 
shown that it is incapable and unwilling to effectively regulate 
its nonpoint source pollution. I 18 
Specifically, the USFS has not effectively managed water 
quality impacts from grazing. The main tool the USFS uses to 
ensure compliance with BMPs is the Best Management Prac-
115 See id. at 2-3. The term "contemplates" was the subject of dispute between the 
USFS and the State Water Resources Control Board (CSWRCB). The USFS asserted 
that compliance with BMPs categorically exempted them from reporting waste dis-
charge requirements under the MAA. In a Memorandum by Walt Petit, the executive 
director of the CSWRCB, Mr. Petit stated that "the MAA only indicated a 'contempla-
tion' that compliance with BMPs would result in a waiver of waste discharge require-
ments." Memorandum from Walt Petit, Executive Director, Interpretation of 
CSWRCB's Management Agency Agreement with United States Forest Service at 3 
(Jan. 23, 1995) (on file with author). 
116 
Management Agency Agreement Between the State Water Resources Control 
Board, State of California and the Forest Service, United States Department of Agri-
culture (May 26, 1981) (on file with author) p. 2. 
117 [d. at 2. "The Forest Service agrees: (b) to implement on NFS lands statewide 
the practices and procedures in the Forest Service 208 Report." [d. The 208 Report 
"sets forth the practices and procedures for controlling nonpoint sources o~ pollution on 
designated federal lands." Memorandum from Walt Petit, Executive Director, Inter-
pretation of CSWRCB's Management Agency Agreement with United States Forest 
Service (Jan. 23, 1995) (on file with author) at 2. 
118 In Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson', 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986) 
[hereinafter Peterson], the USFS argued that it did not have to comply with the state 
Water Quality Management Plan because the BMP requirement in the MAA super-
ceded. The court held that BMPs are "merely a means to achieve the appropriate 
state Plan water quality standard," and "adherence to the BMPs does not automati-
cally ensure that the applicable state standards are being met." [d. at 697. Peterson 
exemplifies how the USFS has not put water quality as a priority, but rather has at-
tempted to use the MAA as a license to pollute. 
22
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tices Evaluation Program (BMPEP) for the Pacific Southwest 
Region. 119 Results from the BMPEP show that Range Man-
agement BMPs were implemented only 56 percent of the 
time. 120 Even when Range Management BMPs were imple-
mented, they were considered effective only 83 percent of the 
time. 12I Further, at the time of the BMPEP, the USFS had not 
complied with the MAA requirement of creating Allotment 
Management Plans l22 for all USFS grazing allotments. These 
plans are needed to control the violations of state water quality 
standards documented on USFS grazing allotments. 123 A Re-
gional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB) memorandum 
illustrates the ineffectiveness of the BMPs. The memorandum 
states that BMPs have not been proven to prevent nonpoint 
source pollution, and the USFS should make an effort to "dis-
pel this myth. "124 Therefore, by relying too heavily on BMPs 
and refusing to self monitor, the USFS has failed to adequately 
prevent nonpoint source pollution. 
Like the USFS, the BLM is incapable of managing non point 
source pollution on its rangeland. The BLM entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the CSWRCB in 
119 The BMPEP is an ongoing study conducted by the USFS assessing the level of 
implementation and effectiveness of the chosen BMPs on Forest Service land. The 
USFS uses the BMPEP to satisfy the self-monitoring requirements in the 208 Report. 
Pacific Southwest Region Forest Service Best Management Practices Evaluation Pro-
gram, On-Site Component Report Analysis Completed (1997) (on file with author). 
120 See id. at 6. "G24 Range Management 56 percent Implementation." Id. 
121 See id. at 3. "Table 1 Results of Analysis, shown by implementation 
leffectiveness outcome." Id. Author arrived at the 83 percent effectiveness figure by 
dividing the total number of BMPs that were implemented and considered effective 
(52) by the total number of BMPs that were implemented (63) BMPs. 
122 
Allotment Management Plans are specific plans designed by the USFS to ad-
minister proper grazing practices on Forest Service land. 
123 Letter from Harold J. Singer, Executive Officer, California Regional Water 
Quality Control Board (Lahontan Region), to G. Lynn Sprague, Regional Forester, 
USDA Forest Service, p. 6 (Oct. 13, 1998) (on file with author). "17 years have now 
passed since the MAA was signed. AMPs have not been implemented for many graz-
ing allotments. Violations of State water quality standards have been documented at 
USFS grazing allotments." Id. 
124 Memorandum from Anonymous Source (source requested anonymity, hereinaf-
ter: Anonymous Source) to State Water Resources Control Board- Department of Wa-
ter Quality (Sept. 17, 1996) (on file with author). 
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1993, which laid the groundwork for a future MAA between 
the two agencies. 125 Similar to the USFS, the BLM is responsi-
ble for regulating and monitoring nonpoint source pollution 
within its jurisdiction. 126 Every year the BLM publishes "Public 
Land Statistics" (PLS), the BLM's yearly statistical report.127 
In 1997, the BLM authorized grazing for 284,000 Animal Unit 
Months (AUMs) on BLM land in California. 128 In addition to 
recording grazing data, the PLS classified BLM California land 
holdings by ecological status. 129 The PLS revealed that 72 per-
cent of BLM land assessed in California had less than 50 per-
cent of its potential natural vegetation. 130 Further, only 3 per-
cent of the BLM land assessed in California had over 76 per-
cent of its potential natural vegetation. 131 In addition, only 50 
percent of the 3,500 riparian miles (areas heavily impacted by 
grazing) of BLM's California land were in proper functioning 
condition. 132 Therefore, by the BLM's own accounting, the BLM 
125 See supra, note Ill. 
126 
See id. at 3. BLM agrees to: IV (A)(4) "Incorporate Best Management Prac-
ticesfManagement Measures/Nonpoint Source Measures into BLM land uses and BLM 
permitted land uses, when necessary to protect or maintain water quality." See id. 
127 
The Public Land Statistics publication presents in textual and tabular form, 
the annual summary of the BLM's land holdings, commercial uses of BLM land, rec-
reational activity on BLM land, and preservation and public health statistics. United 
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statis-
tics 1997, Vol. 182 (March 1998). 
128 See id. at 62-63. Tables 3-5, 3-6, Summary of authorized U8e of grazing district 
(section 3) lands, Summary of authorized use of grazing lease (second 15) lands, fiscal 
year 1997. Author calculated 284,000 AUMs by adding the total number of AUMs 
from grazing district lands with the total number of AUMs from grazing lease lands. 
129 
See id. at 35. Table 2-1, Percent of acreage by ecological status by state, fiscal 
year 1997. 
130 See id. The PLS defines Mid Seral state as present vegetative conditions being 
between 26 to 50 percent similar to potential natural, or climax, plant community. It 
defines Early Seral as present vegetative conditions being between 0 and 25 percent 
similar to potential natural, or climax, plant community. The BLM has identified 
California BLM land as being 42 percent Mid Seral state and 30 percent Early Seral. 
Thus, 72 percent of the BLM assessed has less than 50 percent of its potential natural 
vegetation. See id. 
131 
See id. 
132 
See United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management: 
Public Land Statistics 1997, Vol. 182 (March 1998) at 36. Table 2-2, Condition of 
riparian-wetland areas, fiscal year 1997. The BLM defines proper functioning condi-
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has not adequately implemented BMPs and has failed to ad-
here to California the MOU, and hence, to state water quality 
standards. 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has also docu-
mented the BLM's inability to manage the range. 133 The GAO 
Rangeland Management Report found that "BLM's current 
livestock grazing activity risks long term environmental dam-
age ... some damaged land may take decades to recover if it re-
covers at all. "134 Specifically, in California, twenty-one acres of 
BLM range are required on average for each AUM.135 This av-
erage is the highest of any state in the west and is almost dou-
ble the overall BLM average of twelve acres per AUM.136 The 
refusal of the BLM to modify its grazing practices to mitigate 
environmental damage is evidence of the need for a more pro-
active state policy. 
The extent to which the CSWRCB will force the USFS and 
the BLM to comply with state water quality standards is al-
ways dependent on the political inclinations of the prevailing 
state government. 137 Incorporating Section 401 certification 
into the regulatory process would help insulate state water 
quality managers from the effects of political mood swings and 
tion as when "adequate vegetation, landform, or large woody debris is present to dissi-
pate the energy associated with high water flows." Id at 33. 
133 Government Accounting Office, GAOrr-RCED-92-60, Rangeland Management: 
Results of Recent Work Addressing the Performance of Land Management Agencies 
(1992). 
134 
Id. at 5. 
135 . Government Accountmg Office, GAOIRCED-92-213FS, Rangeland Manage-
ment: Profile of the Bureau of Land Management's Grazing Allotments and Permits, p. 
12 (1992). Table 1.4, Average Stocking Rate, by BLM State Office. See id. 
136 Government Accounting Office, GAOIRCED-92-213FS, Rangeland Manage-
ment: Profile of the Bureau of Land Management's Grazing Allotments and Permits, p. 
12 (1992). In the ten western states the average acreage required for one AUM is 12.3 
with the following range: 5.9 acres (Montana), and 20.9 acres (California). See id. 
137 State Water Resource Control Board (visited Dec. 12, 1999) 
<http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/generaVswrcb.htm>. The members of the CSWRCB are 
appointed officials. Thus, board actions are effected by the Governor's office. "The 
SWRCB consists of five full-time salaried Members, each filling a different specialty 
position. Board members are appointed to four-year terms by the Governor and con-
firmed by the Senate." Id. 
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powerful special interests. If California required Section 401 
certification for all federal activities likely to have an effect on 
water quality as part of its normal operating procedure, post 
violation power struggles could be avoided. For instance, cur-
rently, the CSWRCB will not certify that the current practices 
under the MAA and MOU, with the USFS and the BLM re-
spectively, comply with California's water quality standards.138 
Had the state required Section 401 certification before entering 
a binding agreement with the USFS and the BLM, the current 
power struggle and water quality impairment would have been 
largely avoided. 
In addition, Section 401 certification has often been directly 
handled by the Regional Water Quality Control Boards 
(RWQCB) which are "less affected by the movers and the shak-
ers than state officials."139 Thus, if certification of a permit was 
based on compliance with state water standards and not on 
implementation of BMPs, the issue of the adequacy of BMPs 
and their level of implementation would become significantly 
less important. Putting certification power into the hands of 
regional technical staff would proactively avoid nonpoint 
source water pollution by requiring all permitted activities to 
conform to state water quality standards before certification is 
granted. 140 
Thus, the Dombeck decision will heavily impact the ability 
of the state to comply with the Act's mandate of regulating 
nonpoint source pollution. 
138 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source (April 25, 1999). A chief planner 
at a CRWQCB who wished to remain anonymous, said that "the current MAA with 
the USFS would not receive 401 certification without substantial changes to the cur-
rent practices." [d. 
139 [d. Anonymous Source stated that the CSWRCB had never pres8ured this 
RWQCB officer to certify or not certify any particular activity. See id. 
140 f h . . f I' . h te I t e permIts were contingent upon a shoWlng 0 comp lance WIt state wa r 
quality standards, violations would be reduced. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: SECTION 401 CERTIFICATION INCLUDES 
CERTIFICATION OF NONPOINT SOURCE DISCHARGES 
127 
Under Dombeck, federal agencies are not required to obtain 
state certification for grazing permits, or any other federal li-
censes that may cause pollution exclusively from non point 
sources. 141 As noted above, the Ninth Circuit's language ap-
pears to go even further, and threaten existing Section 401 cer-
tifications. A contrary decision would require the court to ei-
ther rule that Section 401 certification applies to all nonpoint 
source discharges, or to distinguish between nonpoint sources 
that are subject to Section 401 and those that are not. The 
first scenario obviously places a much less onerous burden on 
the court in terms of interpreting the statute. Both scenarios, 
however, create new challenges for the state and federal gov-
ernments, as well as create new avenues of enforcement for the 
states. 
State certification of federal activities resulting in nonpoint 
source water pollution would have substantially enhanced 
California's ability to regulate non point source pollution. 
While the state may incur a minimal administrative burden by 
extending certification to include federal activities resulting in 
nonpoint source pollution, this burden would be outweighed by 
the benefits from Section 401 certification. The state would be 
better able to protect its water supply by having the power to 
stop nonpoint source pollution before it happens, as opposed to 
being restricted to filing after-the-fact appeals. While all 
states may not choose to utilize Section 401 certification ag-
gressively as a tool in water quality management, certification 
does give states like California the ability to require federally 
permitted activities to comply with state water quality stan-
dards. 
Scott Smithline* 
141 
See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 172 F.3d at 6 . 
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encouragement and guidance, his editor, Scott Sanford, for endless edits, and his wife, 
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